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Currently, a musician working with digital technol-
ogy is faced with a panoply of musical tools that
can be roughly characterized by a split between
ready-made music production software on the one
hand, and audio-programming environments such
as SuperCollider, CSound, Pure Data, Max/MSP,
ChucK, or Audiomulch (to name but a few) on the
other. Problems with the former lie in the concep-
tual and compositional constraints imposed upon
users by software tools that clearly define the scope
of available musical expressions. It is for this reason
that many musicians, determined to fight the fos-
silization of music into stylistic boxes, often choose
to work with programming environments that allow
for more extensive experimentation. However, prob-
lems here include the practically infinite expressive
scope of the environment, sometimes resulting in
a creative paralysis or in the frequent symptom
of a musician-turned-engineer. Consequently, a
common strategy can be detected, defined here as
that of designing constraints, where the instru-
ment designer, the composer, or the performer (a
distinction often irrelevant in these systems; see
Drummond 2009) devises a relatively high-level
system of constraints, encapsulating a defined space
for potential expression, whether of compositional
or gestural nature.
This article engages with this situation by ex-
ploring the Human–Computer Interaction (HCI)
concepts of affordances, constraints, and mapping.
We examine how computational systems of musical
expression always involve the establishment of a
particular stratum that provides certain affordances
to the musician, while concurrently posing impor-
tant constraints. The article studies how constraints
can serve as sources for creative explorations. For
this purpose, three systems are analyzed: the mLog,
Phalanger, and the ixi lang. All these systems are
instantiations that proscribe complexity in favor
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of a clear, explicit space of gestural trajectories
and musical scope. Yet, in their nature as digital
systems, we find that the named concretizations
are always arbitrary, dynamic, and highly transient,
posing problems for the instrument’s identity and
historical continuity.
Affordances and Constraints
The phenomenological method of philosophical
inquiry, founded by philosophers such as Husserl,
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, has influenced much
work in HCI (e.g., Winograd and Flores 1986;
Dourish 2001). A related, yet narrower, focus of
the relationship between the human and the world
has been studied under the terms of ecological
psychology. The ecological approach to cognition
was developed by psychologist James J. Gibson, who
studied human perception and the environment as a
dynamic system (Gibson 1979). The field of HCI has
incorporated many important concepts derived from
ecological psychology, such as ecological affordance
and constraint. The former is more commonly used
within HCI (e.g., Norman 1988; Gaver 1991), but
this article argues that in the context of musical
interfaces, the latter might be more pertinent.
Affordances
Gibson (1979, p. 127) initially defined an environ-
mental affordance as “what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”
In this definition, affordances are properties of the
relationship between the environment and the agent
(human or animal). The relationship consists of a
mapping between the properties of the environment
to the potential actions of the agent. An instrument
such as the violin affords certain actions to the
human that it does not afford to a bee. Influenced
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by Gibson, Donald Norman, working in the field of
HCI, introduced the idea of perceived affordances
(Norman 1988): the properties that the agent per-
ceives as possible actions upon an object. This is a
narrower definition, as Gibson’s original definition
of affordances saw them as existing independently of
the agent’s perception—a view supported by Gaver
(1991), who talks about perceptible, hidden, and
false affordances. Norman’s view has been influ-
ential in the field of HCI to the degree that most
contemporary designers are aware of the importance
of affordances in system design.
Affordances have also been defined as entirely
subjective. Vera and Simon (1993) define affordances
as “carefully and simply encoded internal repre-
sentations of complex configurations of external
objects, the encodings capturing the functional
significance of the object.” Costall (1995) extends
this definition of affordance to also signify a social
construction, something that people learn from
each other in every culture. A physical object will
thus have different affordances in different cultures.
However, to get around the relativism of the social
constructivist argument, he proposes the “canonical
affordance” (Costall 1997) of an object as derived
from its name; one hammers with a hammer,
wrenches with a wrench, and thus “computes” with
a computer.
IanHutchby (2001) disagrees. For him, affordances
are important precisely because they are not culture-
specific. They can provide objectivity, constituting
a common platform that exists beyond all cultural
difference. Hutchby claims that—as opposed to the
views of Grint and Woolgar (1997), who propose
a technological hermeneutics—technology exists
in a real, physical world that is not reducible
to textual interpretation: “Different technologies
possess different affordances, and these affordances
constrain the ways that they can possibly be
‘written’ or ‘read”’ (Hutchby 2001, p. 447). A
musical instrument thus affords certain ways of
playing, but at the same time it allows for a cultural
reading of its expressive scope: It is clear how the
affordances of certain instruments change when
they are taken into use in different cultures.
One could arguably take a compromise stance
between the objective and cultural definitions.
From the perspective of phenomenologically in-
spired enactivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
1991), it can be argued that it is impossible to
talk about affordances that are not grounded in a
specific culture. This article therefore rejects the
subjective view of affordances maintained by Vera
and Simon (1993). Affordances are not represen-
tational structures of the object in the subject’s
mind. They are rather seen as potential applications
derived from the agent’s embodied relationship
with the object in the enactive sense, therefore
maintaining the original meaning of affordances as
non-representational. However, as this section has
illustrated, it is clear that there are certain problems
using the term “affordance,” considering its highly
varied interpretations and definitions.
Constraints
Margaret A. Boden defines constraints as one of the
fundamental sources for creativity: “[F]ar from being
the antithesis of creativity, constraints on thinking
are what make it possible. . . . Constraints map out
a territory of structural possibilities which can then
be explored, and perhaps transformed to give another
one” (Boden 1990, p. 95). For Boden, the continuity
of cultural constraints constitutes the possibility
to evaluate creative work, or to recognize ideas as
creative. All cultures are founded on constraints;
they are the rule-sets that maintain dynamic
unity. Constraints can be implicitly understood
and explicitly formulated. Constraints are also a
term used in compositional theory (Courtot 1992;
Ebciog`lu 1992; Anders and Miranda 2008). Here,
constraints are seen as compositional rules that the
computer (or the human) must follow.
Cultural or ideological constraints are not the
only constraints. Composers and performers must
also engage with the physical constraints of the
musical instrument that they are composing for
or playing. The physical constraints of the piano
define its expressive scope, just as the theoretical
constraints of a compositional system (such as
the 12-tone system) define the compositional
scope. Furthermore, the pianist’s style of playing
the composition is highly dependent on cultural
constraints.
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Variousmodels of constraints have been proposed.
Norman (1999) brings forth a model of physical, log-
ical, and cultural constraints. Physical constraints
define what can be performed with the physical en-
vironment, such as the mouse cursor’s not leaving
the computer screen. Logical constraints outline
how human logic inductively informs us about
the environment. Cultural constraints are shared
by cultural groups that form specific conventions
(Norman 1999). In the field of music, Pearce and
Wiggins (2002) define the working constraints of a
composer into three categories: stylistic constraints,
where the composer is working within the limits
of a specific genre or style; internal constraints, the
logical possibilities of how the piece can progress
according to the rule set that has been implicitly
or explicitly set; and external constraints, the need
to be sure that the piece is physically possible for a
performer.
In the context of this article, an alternative
model of constraints is presented. It focuses on
the philosophical–technological relationship be-
tween the human and the tool, and it takes
into account the social context in which they
exist. Here, I define subjective constraints as re-
ferring to the expressive limitations that face the
thinking, creative, performing human. They orig-
inate from a long inscription of the musician into
a musical tradition, where the musician habitu-
ates (Bourdieu 1990) the practices of the tradition.
Objective constraints represent the physical lim-
itations of the environment or physical material
and the designed constraints of human tools.
Examples include the inability to play very high-
pitched notes on a double bass or to control the
amplitude envelope of a note played on a piano.
These constraints also exist in software. Cul-
tural constraints are the conditions in which
both technology and ideas exist. They affect
the musician who becomes constrained by the
technology at hand and the cultural values that
underpin its design. In this context, it is im-
portant to traverse beyond the simple dualism
between sociological constructivism and techno-
logical determinism. Technology is defined by
culture but equally defines it as well (Latour
1994).
Musicians often have problems breaking an
instrument’s cultural constraints. These problems
are partly owing to extensive training in a particular
musical culture where the instrument has become
the vehicle of certainmusical practices. The cultural
constraints thus inform subjective constraints,
where musicians are defined by the implicit or
explicit rules of the musical tradition in which they
participate. Objective constraints affect creativity
as well. Here, the musician might reject the script
of the instrument and reinterpret it (Akrich 1992).
An example is the “table-top guitar,” where an
electric guitar is used in a manner for which it was
not designed. For Boden (1990), constraints such
as these constitute a search space in which three
types of creativity can take place: combinatorial,
explorative, and transformational. It is beyond the
scope of this article to explore Boden’s theory of
creativity, but it is important to point out that the
study of constraints is a complex field that can
be beneficial to designers of musical instruments,
composers, and performers alike.
Affordances or Constraints?
In HCI, affordance is typically defined as the
perceived capacity of a system for certain actions.
It is a feature of the object that can be acted
upon: a chair on which to sit, a button to press,
a mouthpiece into which to blow. In the context
of musical instruments, both acoustic and digital,
constraints can be defined as their limitations. As
opposed to affordances, the constraints of a musical
instrument are often not directly perceptible at the
initial encounter. They become understood through
engagement and experience. Similarly, the fugue is
a musical form that is defined by its constraints—
what is allowed and what not. This is different from
how the composer considers the affordances of the
instruments they compose for, or the affordances
of music in the sense of what it “makes possible”
(DeNora 2003, p. 46), such as emotional catharsis
or dancing (Clarke 2003, p. 120). The two terms are
complementary as they focus on different aspects of
the same system.
Simple physical objects have easily detectable
affordances. The hammer invites hammering; the
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knob of the mixing console invites turning. Af-
fordance thus appears as an HCI term for early
computer systems, where user interaction happens
through low-bandwidth input channels, and the
tasks to be performed are relatively simple. Con-
trarily, in complex virtual systems, such as digital
musical instruments, affordances can be impercep-
tible. Thus, the term constraints proves to be more
descriptive of what happens in the design and the
use of these systems. Instrument makers actively
design affordances according their understanding of
musical performance and composition. Users, if not
the designers themselves, will then engage with the
instrument and learn about its expressive potential
through experience, building an embodied tacit
knowledge (Polanyi 1966) of the system. Owing to
the complexities involved in technological artifacts
that originate in such an integrated cultural practice
as music, learning a digital musical instrument is
therefore more appropriately described as “getting a
feeling” for the instrument’s constraints, rather than
engaging with its affordances. If the focus in the de-
sign of a door opener is its affordance, the focus in the
design of a digital musical instrument goes beyond
that to what it can unveil and where its limits lie.
Mapping as Designing Constraints
Mapping is perhaps the most integral feature of
new digital musical instruments (Winkler 1995;
Chadabe 1997; Bongers 2000; Hunt and Kirk 2000;
Orio, Schnell, and Wanderley 2001; Jorda` 2005).
Its prevalence ranges from ergonomic strategies to
compositional features. Some authors (Bongers 2000;
Jorda` 2005) advocate the view that the interface and
the sound engine should be considered holistically as
one system, as a unified instrument for expression.
Such a view can be beneficial, as the instrument is
easier to understand by a composer or a performer,
perhaps helping the instrument to gain historical
continuity. However, this dream of the digital
musical interface to establish itself, to concretize
(or pointillize, in the lingo of actor-network theory)
might be a mere pipe dream. Even if the instrument
is presented as a unified object, it will always be
characterized by the split between the interface
and the sound engine, connected by a mapping
engine of diversified complexity. The sound and
mapping engines serve as the core of the digital
musical instrument; they are its “real body.” This is
the location where constraints are defined and the
instrument’s functionality constructed. However,
unlike the case of acoustic instruments, such
design is rarely final owing to the highly arbitrary
nature of digital design, which is more or less
free from material constraints. The digital musical
instrument is perpetually evolving, although a few
designer/performers have made efforts to “freeze”
the state of the instrument to gain better mastery of
it (Waisvisz 1999).
The design of a musical instrument or a com-
position is a design decision conditioned by the
properties found in the source material. These prop-
erties map to the constraints described previously,
namely, objective constraints (including the affor-
dances of the physical gestural interface and the
limitations of the programming language, protocols,
or hardware), cultural constraints (the style of music
for which the system is designed), and subjective
constraints (the background and experience of the
designer). However, even if controllers, program-
ming environments, or musical styles are broader
than any one composition or musical instrument,
these elements represent a musical system that is
necessarily conditioned by an intricate process of
analyses, categorizations, normalizations, abstrac-
tions, and constructions, where the design paths
taken are often determined by highly personal,
culturally conditioned, and often arbitrary reasons.
Considering all the available parameters and func-
tions, mapping should be defined as a compositional
process that engenders a structure of constraints.
As mentioned, the distinctions between the
composer, performer, and instrument designer
become blurred in progressive digital music. The
creator is typically one and the same, which is
why Jorda` (2005) uses the term “digital luthier”
for those who not only build but also perform
with their instruments. Pe´rez, Knapp, and Alcorn
(2007) make a distinction between what could
be defined as composition-based and instrument-
based approaches to the design of digital musical
systems, prompting Paine (2009) to ask where one
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Figure 1. Typical model of
the musical interface
(Wanderley 2000; Leman
2008; Wessel and Wright
2001). Here, the split
between the gestural
interface (either virtual or
physical) and the sound
engine is bridged by the
mapping engine. However,
the instrumental model is
defined as the core of the
instrument, where
constraints are
programmatically defined.
can define the location of the instrument. Figure 1
attempts to define the instrument’s (and equally
the composition’s) core in the instrumental model.
Through this integrated and complex process of
design, the results will always be highly personal
abstractions that will influence and instigate ideas
in the musician using the system. This has provoked
the realization in recent work that the system itself
becomes an important actor in the ecosystem of
the musical performance, not merely influencing
and directing through musical encodings, but
also extending and augmenting the cognitive and
physical capacity of the musician (Gurevich and
Trevin˜o 2007; Waters 2007; Bown, Eldridge, and
McCormack 2009; Magnusson 2009).
Three Musical Systems That Have High Constraints
All musical systems, from compositional
theories to musical instruments, can be seen
as systems of constraints. These systems
can be located on strata of expressivity. Some
are intended to be platforms for general com-
position or instrument-making, whereas others
are abstracted systems for particular purposes.
As a case study, I refrain from analyzing the
ixiQuarks software, deliberately designed as
systems of high constraints (Magnusson 2007).
Instead, I will describe my experience as the
user of two systems with which I have had
the good fortune to compose: mLog by the
Owl Project group and Phalanger by Chris
Kiefer. I will also describe ixi lang, a live-
coding system I wrote in SuperCollider. The
creation of these musical systems involved
first a thorough exploration and understanding
of the source material (hardware, controllers,
and programming languages), and second, ab-
stractions or concretizations built on those
platforms, equally definable as instruments or
compositions.
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mLog
The mLog is a sensor interface designed by the
Manchester-based art collective Owl Project. It
is a wooden log containing a MUIO sensor in-
terface (www.muio.org) that receives eight digital
and four analog sensor inputs. As seen in Figure 2,
the mLog has two switches, two potentiometers,
six pushbuttons (four on the back), and a two-
dimensional accelerometer. It is a perfect example
of a physical interface with clear affordances. For
the author, the objective constraints of the mLog
provided a liberation from complexity and the
infinite choices provided by an audio program-
ming language such as SuperCollider. By being
given the affordances in the form of a physical
entity, the design of the instrument predomi-
nantly involved decisions on how to map the
interface functionality to a custom sound engine.
The composition was therefore highly inspired
and constrained by the interface itself. How-
ever, as Figure 1 indicates, it should primarily
be located at the level of the audio and mapping
engines.
Three compositions were written for the mLog;
these represent three different musical instru-
ments. Although the physical interface remains
the same, its instrumental functionality differs
completely in all three manifestations as a cou-
pled instrument. As its designer, the author felt
strongly that the main “body” of the instrument
resides at the level of code. The physical inter-
face is merely the control mechanism providing
certain affordances for physical action, but men-
tally, the performer is engaging with attributes
and constraints defined in code. Therefore, the
physical controller itself, the mLog, could easily
be exchanged for a controller with similar af-
fordances (for example a Wiimote or an iPhone)
without much change in musical expression. For
this reason, I argue that the primary instrumental
model (with regard to the question of where the
instrument is) should be defined as the mapping
engine and sound engine combined, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Accordingly, it is the instrumental
model that primarily represents the instrument’s
constraints.
Figure 2. Typical mLog.
The wooden log contains
the ingredients that make
up a constrained
expressive interface. A
USB or Bluetooth
connection with the
computer sends
OSC-formatted
information from the
MUIO chip to the
programming language.
Phalanger
Phalanger is a computer-vision system intended
to facilitate musical control (Kiefer, Collins, and
Fitzpatrick 2009). It contains a neural network that
detects skin color and a support vector machine
(Christianini and Shawe-Taylor 2000) that can be
taught hand movements defined by the user. This
training consists first of detecting skin color and the
background, and second of learning hand gestures.
Figure 3 shows how the application detects the skin
color of the performer and recognizes the gesture
performed. The gestures are given their unique
integer identification (ID) numbers. After the train-
ing process (which takes only a few minutes), the
system outputs Open Sound Control (OSC) infor-
mation containing the normalized centroid, contour
points, and, most importantly, the gesture IDs.
The affordances of Phalanger are very different
from those of the mLog. There are certain important
limitations derived from the nature of the system
itself. For example, it only detects one hand, the
light must remain constant, and the background
must be the same throughout the session. Apart
from the system’s objective constraints, such as
the ability to recognize shapes, other limitations
primarily involve the flexibility of the hand and
the user’s capacity of memorizing hand gestures
(which are rarely symbolic except for speakers of
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Figure 3. Phalanger in
action. The performer
forms a hand gesture that
has acquired an identity
through training of the
neural network. Phalanger
sends OSC information
from the video-analysis
application to the
programming language.
sign languages). For this author, designing musical
systems for Phalanger was an intriguing process. A
current of gestural data flows from Phalanger into
SuperCollider, which is used as the mapping and
sound engine. Any gesture ID can be mapped to
any musical event, and in the main composition, a
decision was taken to use gesture IDs to instantiate
a corresponding number of complex SuperCollider
synths whose parameters could be controlled with
free hand movements (i.e., using centroid and
contour data).
Phalanger poses an interesting addition to the
model presented in Figure 1. As the neural network
can be taught hand gestures and these saved into a
gesture file, Phalanger can be used to load in different
files of different gesture combinations. Each training
session therefore yields a new controller. Different
controllers can control the same sound engine, or
alternatively, one controller can steer many sound
engines. Again, the attempt to define a unified
instrument feels unnatural, as the core of the
instrument can be found in its mapping. In terms
of performer skills, the author was able to build
up a repository of hand gestures that were used as
symbols for features in the sound system. However,
practice is needed for the proper incorporation of
these gestures. Continuity with these instruments
is unlikely to happen, as every session prompts new
ideas, new connections in the mapping engine, or
new features in the sound engine. For the author, the
instances of musical instruments or compositions
built in Phalanger will always be of a highly transient
nature.
ixi lang
A typical problem for the live coder is the high level
of expertise required for such performance (Nilson
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2007). Very few performers are able to exhibit those
skills without consistent dedication to practice
(Sorensen and Brown 2007). Although fascinated
by certain virtuosic live coders, it seemed to this
author that such incorporation of dexterity strives
against the primary rationale of the mechanical
computer, namely, the automation of rote tasks and
the augmentation of mental capacity. The decision
was therefore taken to design a musical live coding
programming language that frees performers from
having to think at the level of computer science,
allowing them to engage directly with music
through a high-level representation of musical
patterns. Naturally some degree of algorithmic
thinking and consideration of syntax is required.
The ixi lang is a live coding programming lan-
guage whose interpreter is built in SuperCollider,
thus concomitantly gaining access to the underly-
ing power of that environment. However, unlike
SuperCollider, the aim with the language was to
create expressive constraints. Inspired by operator
overloading in C++, the live coding systems of
Alex McLean (2004), and esoteric languages such as
Whitespace and Brainf k (see www.esolangs.org),
the ixi lang was designed as a high-level system
that affords certain types of musical patterns, but
excludes others. As such, the system itself becomes
a compositional form. Here, constraints inherent
in the language are seen as providing freedom from
complexity, yet defining a large-enough search space
(Boden 1990) for musicians other than the author to
explore and express themselves. As seen in Figure 4,
the language is very simple and intuitive for the au-
dience. Code can be written that changes other code
(and updates the code in the same document), which
allows for complex structures and changes over time
that are not directly called by the performers.
The ixi lang affords a specific set of musical
activities. It provides a scaffold for externalizing
musical thinking (Clark 2008) and, through its
simplicity, attempts to ease the live coder’s cognitive
load. As a live-coding system, it goes further
than most common live-coding environments in
providing a simple, high-level platform for musical
expression. As the system iswritten in SuperCollider
(SC), normal SC code can easily be written in the
same document, allowing the user to tap into the
Figure 4. Screenshot of the
ixi lang. Each line is
written and evaluated in
real time, giving the
performer full control of
the music, but within set
constraints inscribed in
the programming language
itself.
extensive scope of SuperCollider itself. Learning the
affordances of ixi lang as presented in its language
constructs might take a couple of hours, but getting
an overview of the system’s constraints can take
many long sessions of practice.
Comparison of the Three Systems
Of the three systems, it is perhaps only the mLog
that lends itself to be effectively studied by the
theory of affordances. The mLog has perceivable
affordances (i.e., the buttons, the knobs, and the
hidden accelerometer). Phalanger has no clearly
identifiable perceivable affordances. Its physical
interface is the camera, but ultimately it is the
user who defines the functionality of the system by
training its gesture-recognition algorithm. Similarly,
the ixi lang has affordances in terms of the methods
and functions the system provides.
For this reason, it is argued here that the focus,
when designing and analyzing new interfaces for
musical expression, should rather be on constraints
than affordances, although the latter are always
naturally present. It could be roughly stated that
affordances have to do with usability, whereas con-
straints define the limits of musical expression.
This can be clarified by the fact that after the initial
encounter with a musical instrument (when its
affordances are studied), the performer spends more
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time in exploring and engaging with the instru-
ment’s constraints. A recent survey (Magnusson
and Hurtado Mendieta 2008) has shown that people
enjoy and are inspired by exploring the limitations
of digital musical instruments.
Systems like the three described here are so open
and flexible as interfaces that it is only when they
have been given rigid mapping to sound engines that
they gain their function—and indeed identity—as
expressive musical systems. This process of creating
identity is a process of designing constraints. The
performer of the system, when practicing and
performing with it, is mentally engaging with the
system’s constraints rather than affordances. The
constraints can be the source of creative inspiration,
thus freeing the composer from too much choice
and defining the search space by outlining musical
rules. This is typical and common in the world
of acoustic instruments, but in computer music,
these constraints must be actively and consciously
defined by the designer/composer.
Virtuosity as Mental Skill in Digital
Musical Instruments
The three systems analyzed herein can be defined
as being idiosyncratic; they are adapted to personal
artistic expression, thus obfuscating the distinction
between the instrument and the composition. This
fact illustrates how unlikely it is that many of
the digital musical systems developed today will
establish themselves in the manner of our beloved
acoustic instruments. History, legacy, and tradition
are not the strong features of newmusical interfaces.
There are many reasons for the transient nature of
the new systems, the most obvious being that they
are systems of high-level design of constraints,
originating from the more general expressive mold
of the programming environments. Code can thus
be seen as the wood and strings of the digital
instrument maker, the difference being that in
building the digital system, a great deal of musical
theory is inscribed in the tool, and consequently the
performer’s agency is prescribed. This happens to
some extent in acoustic instruments as well, but to
an intensified degree in digital systems.
In the three systems discussed, it is clear that the
primary skills demonstrated are not at a level that is
directly musical or “instrumental.” Rather, we find
an expertise involving the knowledge of electronics,
computer science, artificial intelligence, and digital
audio synthesis. The primary virtuosity is not at the
level of the instrument itself or in the relationship
between the agent and the object, but rather below
the instrument at the strata of hardware and
code. Similarly, in generative creative systems, the
designer defines the potential semantic space based
on rules that effectively outline the structural limits
of the possible. Virtuosity in contemporary musical
composition can therefore be defined as the skill of
designing and understanding constraints.
The digital musical instrument is a system of con-
straints, both ergonomic and music-theoretical, that
is determined primarily by two factors: the musical
culture in which the designer is located (cultural and
subjective constraints) and the expressive scope of
the programming language or the hardware of which
it is created (objective constraints). The system be-
comes an actor (Latour 1994), a container of musical
theory in the form of an epistemic tool (Magnus-
son 2009) that has a performative and mimetic
agency as a behavioral object (Bown, Eldridge, and
McCormack 2009). In new musical instruments
created with general and diverse building blocks, the
rationale for creating high-level constraints is pri-
marily to engender an identity, a musical world that
is simple, intuitive, and direct. Virtuosity in new
digital instruments thus relates to the understand-
ing of the system’s core, an understanding typically
achieved from the process of being its designer. This
type of virtuosity is not a relationship by a performer
and the perceived affordances of the instrument (an
association found in acoustic instruments), but
rather a habituated (Bourdieu 1990) incorporation
(Hayles 1999) of the system’s constraints achieved
through a knowledge of its material, its mapping
engine, and the exploration of its expressive limits.
Conclusion
From both informal and formal surveys (e.g.,
Magnusson and Hurtado Mendieta 2008) of my
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musical systems, I have realized that in learning
the instrument and engaging with its expressive
potential, people are only initially concerned with
the affordances of the interface. The main bulk
of the time spent in learning the instrument in-
volves building a habituated mental model of its
constraints. Similarly, the Phalanger affords hand-
gesture recognition, but in performance, the user
focuses primarily on the relationship between ges-
tures and parameters in the sound engine. These
parameters define the instrument more than any
physical camera or screen-based representation. The
ixi lang provides a world of constrained expression.
It fortifies simple musical activity and excludes
the bewildering complexity of SuperCollider itself,
although one can make use of that language as well.
This article presented three highly diverse musi-
cal systems that are abstracted from more complex
systems. As abstractions, they become deliberate
designs of constraints, where the making of the
instrument involves composition, or alternatively,
composing involves instrument design. The instru-
ment presents the affordances and some objective
constraints, but it is at the level of the sound and
mapping engines that we find the field of constraints
that becomes the conceptual space (Boden 1990) for
the performer or composer to explore. The design
of a new interface for musical expression involves
the provision of affordances in terms of hardware or
software features, but the primary character of the
instrument is defined by its constraints. Virtuosity
of new musical instruments is therefore not to be
found at the level of the interface itself where the
performer’s body interacts with perceived affor-
dances of the physical interface, but at the level of
code or hardware of various strata, where the struc-
ture of the search space is defined and limitations
are set.
To conclude, it could be said that affordances and
constraints in musical instruments are two sides of
the same coin, but with a change of focus where
affordances point to features that make things possi-
ble and constraints define the limits of the possible.
Composing an instrument therefore implies some
degree of affordance design, but the core activity
typically involves the iterative process of experienc-
ing and adopting the system’s constraints. Through
this process, a limited artifact (the instrument) is
abstracted out of another more general artifact (the
programming language), and a coherent expressive
structure of musical possibilities emerges.
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